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THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  









The concentrated ownership structure in Indonesian company led to agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder, agency problem type II. This 
problem may lead to expropriation used by the controlling shareholder to maximize their 
own interest against the minority shareholders. This research primarily aims to examine the 
effect of corporate governance on expropriation. The population research is Indonesian 
public companies in 2016. Sample is selected using purposive sampling technique resulted 
in 91 samples. The results show that corporate governance recommendations, frequency of 
board commissioner meeting and frequency of audit committee meeting affect to the 
expropriation. While, independent board commissioner does not affect to the expropriation. 
This study contributes to agency theory type II, conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders, which can be overcome through corporate governance.  
 





























Imam Subekti, Ph.D., Ak., CA. 
 
 
Struktur kepemilikan di Indonesia menyebabkan munculnya konflik keagenan antara 
pemegang saham pengendali dan pemegang sahamm non-pengendasi yang dikenal dengan 
masalah agensi tipe II. Masalah ini akan menimbulkan ekspropriasi oleh pemegang saham 
pengendali untuk memaksimalkan keuntungan mereka sendiri terhadap pemegang saham 
non-pengendali. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh tata kelola terhadap 
praktik ekspropriasi. Populasi di dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahan public di Indonesia 
tahun 2016. Pemilihan sampel menggunakan teknik purposive sampling menghasilkan 91 
sampel. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa rekomendasi tata kelola, frekuensi 
rapat dewan komisaris dan komite audit berpengaruh terhadap ekspropriasi.  Sedangkan, 
komisaris independen tidak berpengaruh terhadap ekspropriasi. Penelitian ini berkontribusi 
pada teori agensi tipe II yang membahas konflik pemegang saham pengendali dan non-
pengendali, yang dapat diatasi dengan menggunakan mekanisme tata kelola.  
 














































1.1 Research Background 
Indonesia is a country adopting civil law system as a part of the Dutch 
colonial law legacy. One of the character of a country which apply civil law is poor 
investor protection (Hung, 2000). Its impact on accounting practice is an open 
opportunity for controlling shareholder to manage unfair transactions which will 
harm the non-controlling shareholder (Subekti, 2012). This kind of transaction is a 
form of expropriation through related party transaction. Expropriation is defined as 
a misuse of one’s control powers and enrich controlling shareholder by maximizing 
their own welfare at the expense of minority shareholders (Claessens, Djankov & 
Lang, 1999). Expropriation is done by the controlling shareholder as an insider who 
know more about the condition of the company.  
Controlling shareholder refers to an individual, family or institution that 
owns control either directly or indirectly in the public company on a certain level 
and also commonly known as majority shareholder (Susilowati & Sanjaya, 2015). 
Controlling shareholder typically owns at least 50% or more shares and have greater 
control over the business as well as taking part of managerial responsibility. While 
non-controlling shareholder or minority shareholder is those who own less than 
50% of shares and doesn’t have control over the company (Siregar & HM, 2006).  
Expropriation takes place in a country where the ownership structure is 





















in large numbers such as in Indonesia and other Asian countries. While in 
Commonwealth countries such as United States and Europe, ownership structure is 
more dispersed. The concentrated ownership structure creates a divergence between 
control rights and cash flow right at a specific party as controlling shareholder such 
as family. When control right is greater than cash flow right, it creates a motivation 
for controlling shareholder to maximize their own benefit leading to expropriation 
(Porta, Lopez & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens & Fan, 2002). Furthermore, Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) in nine East Asian countries including Indonesia found 
that more than two thirds of the public companies are controlled by a single 
shareholder, owned by family. This study also supported by a survey conducted by 
PWC (2014) that more than 95% Indonesian’s companies are family owned 
business that spread over in various fields of industry and organization. The survey 
mentioned that the company belonging to various industries listed in Indonesian 
Stock Exchange (IDX) are manufacturing (50%), transportation (13%), 
construction (7%), business activities (13%) and others (5%). The great number of 
family ownership creates a significant aspect that influence the decision making 
and managerial responsibility in the company.  
Concentrated ownership structure can minimize the agency conflict 
between management and shareholder since this type of structure has power to 
control management decisions. The agency problem between agent and principal 
can be overcome, but the problem of conflict of interest between controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholder began to emerge, agency problem type II 





















the main theory used in this research. Having said earlier, when the controlling 
shareholder has more control over the company, it may result in the expropriation. 
Expropriation can take variety of forms, in the simplest way, when the controlling 
shareholders simply steal the profits or sell the assets, outputs, and their shares 
below the market prices to another firm that they own (Porta et al., 1999).  
This research uses expropriation as the independent variable with the proxy 
of related party transactions of sales. Related party transaction is normal, however 
several researches indicated that such transaction could be used to expropriate 
against the minority shareholder by manipulating the transfer pricing. This research 
uses related party transaction that represent the tunneling activities containing the 
conflict of interest hypothesis explained in the agency theory.  
The phenomenon related with expropriation resulted in the discrimination 
of minority shareholder in Indonesia is in Bank Century case in 2008 in which 
Robert Tantular as the controlling shareholder on the disbursement of bank credit 
to his two affiliated companies namely PT. Wibowo Wadah Rezeki and PT. Accent 
Investment Indonesia also demonstrated the weakness of the governance in 
Indonesia (Anonim, 2010). Another case is PT. Sumalindo Tbk in 2012. PT. 
Sumalindo Tbk is one of the biggest wood distributors in Indonesia and owns more 
than 30% of Indonesian forest market. This case was started with one of its minority 
shareholder Deddy Hartawan who feel burdened by the management of PT. 
Sumalindo who violated the principles of good corporate governance. He then 
submitted a petition to the district court in South Jakarta to inspect the company 





















shareholders. PT. Sumalindo Tbk made sales of its subsidiary company’s shares, 
PT. Sumalindo Hutami Jaya below the market price and without informing to 
shareholders general meeting. They also never mentioned the profits made by PT. 
Sumalindo Hutami Jaya in the financial report. In this case, PT. Sumalindo Tbk 
shows that they lack of transparency and accountability which reflect in the 
difficulty in implementing corporate governance (Syabani, 2014; Kurniawan, 
2013).  
Corporate Governance (CG) is one of the mechanisms of investor 
protection. The corporate governance is considered to limit the expropriation 
through the improvement of corporate governance. IFC (2014) defines corporate 
governance as the structures and process for the direction and control of companies. 
The measurement of corporate governance used by prior research to control agency 
problem type II are mostly done by measuring each component of corporate 
governance in which belong to conventional corporate governance mechanism. 
However, the results have been inconsistent. Claessens & Fan (2003) added that the 
conventional corporate governance mechanism used to control agency problem 
type I are less effective and not strong enough to mitigate the agency problems in 
Asia with controlling and minority shareholder conflict, agency problem type II. 
Therefore, the current study raises new measurement of corporate 
governance which is corporate governance recommendations issued by Financial 
Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/ OJK) No. 32/SEOJK.04/2015. Under 
the new rule, there are 25 recommendations in 5 aspects and 8 principles in which 





















report starting from 2016 since it just became effective from 17th November 2015. 
The researcher expects that the result will be more effective because the new 
recommendations are build based on the international corporate governance 
practice including all aspect and principle of corporate governance. In addition, this 
research also uses the conventional corporate governance mechanisms consist of 
board commissioner meeting frequency, audit committee meeting frequency and 
the number of independent commissioner as the independent variables as well.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
Based on the research background, hence the research questions of this 
study are:  
1. Does corporate governance recommendations affect expropriation in 
Indonesian company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2016? 
2. Does board commissioner meeting frequency affect expropriation in 
Indonesian company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2016? 
3. Does audit committee meeting frequency affect expropriation in 
Indonesian company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2016? 
4. Does the number of independent commissioner affect expropriation in 























1.3 Research Objective 
Based on the research problems mentioned above the objectives of this 
study are: 
1. To provide the empirical evidence on the influence of corporate 
governance recommendations on the expropriation in Indonesian 
company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2016. 
2. To provide the empirical evidence on the influence of board 
commissioner meeting frequency on the expropriation in Indonesian 
company listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2016. 
3. To provide the empirical evidence on the influence of audit committee 
meeting frequency on the expropriation in Indonesian company listed in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2016. 
4. To provide the empirical evidence on the influence of the number of 
independent commissioner on the expropriation in Indonesian company 
listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2016. 
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
The result of this research is expected to contribute to: 
1. Theoretical contribution 
The result of this research is contributed to Agency theory type II. The 





















shareholders and minority or non-controlling shareholders which result 
in the expropriation against minority shareholders.   
2. Practical contribution 
The result of this research is expected to show that corporate governance 
will be more effective to reduce the expropriation in Indonesia. 
Moreover, the result of this research also expects that the company 
including the majority shareholders would be more aware in 


























2.1 Agency Theory 
 The agency theory has been extensively used by prior studies to explain the 
relationship between principal and agent. According to Jensen & Meckeling (1976), 
the agency relationship exists when principals (owners or shareholders) formed a 
contract with agent (manager) to perform some tasks on behalf of the principal. 
However, manager tend to maximize their own personal interest, thus a conflict of 
interest between principal and agent arise which is commonly called agency 
problem. This conflict mostly happens in a country where the structure is dispersed 
due to the separation of ownership and control between owner and manager such 
as United States. This agency conflict could be reduced by concentrated ownership 
structure where the owner or shareholder is also a part of the management. However 
this concentrated ownership structure leads to another problem that is a conflict 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders typically called agency 
problem type II (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). This problem is well described in the 
agency theory type II which is the main theory used in this research.  
 The development of agency theory has shifted the focus of the researcher 
from the traditional conflict of interest between principal and agent - agency 
problem type I (Jensen et al., 1976) towards another conflict of interest between 






















problem type II (Villalonga et al.,  2006). In agency theory type II, the controlling 
shareholder act as an agent who manage the company while minority shareholder 
act as a principal. Several studies have conducted research in Asia (Claessens et al., 
2000) found that the majority of companies in Asia are concentrated structure and 
owned by family, thus the company is controlled by a single shareholder. The 
controlling shareholder obviously has more power and control in the company 
leading to the risk of expropriation. Related party transaction (RPT) that represent 
tunneling and contain conflict of interest used by controlling shareholder to take 
their own interest is a form of expropriation. Hence, a set of governance mechanism 
called corporate governance is needed to protect the right of minority shareholder 
(Shleifer et al., 1986). The agency theory type II suggest that the expropriation can 
be minimized through improvement of corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
 The term corporate governance has a broad and various definition. It was 
firstly introduced by the Cadbury Committee in 1992 in their report. According to 
Cadbury report (1992), corporate governance is a system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. Corporate governance is one of the mechanisms of investor 
protection. The corporate governance practices vary across countries depending on 
its history, culture, legal system and so on. In the other words, the corporate 
behavior is influenced by history and culture of the country. The major difference 
of the corporate governance framework among countries is the two-tier separation 






















countries and USA where the corporate’s structure is dispersed, a single tier system 
is implemented where the board of director have both supervisory and management 
role at the same time. While in most of Asian countries including Indonesia adapt 
the two-tier system consisting of board of commissioner and board of directors 
where supervising and management are formally separated (Rick et al., 2005).   
 The OECD principles have been used as a framework and reference for 
corporate governance worldwide. The OECD corporate governance framework is 
built on four core values: fairness, responsibility, transparency and independency. 
Referring to those core values, they are intended to protect the shareholder and 
stakeholder rights, appropriate disclosure and effective board practices. The 
Indonesia’s Corporate Governance Code is one of the many national corporate 
governance codes developed based on the OECD principles and contain certain 
principles which conform to international best practices (IFC, 2014). These 
principles are necessary to attain company’s sustainability and smooth operations. 
The principles are: 
1. Transparency 
Company must provide all issues, materials and relevant information in the 
easiest way to be understood by the stakeholders. Companies also should 
take initiative to disclose all issues not only required by the laws and 
regulations, but also other information crucial to help the shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders in decision making.  






















Company must be responsible for its performance in a transparent and 
reasonable way. Thus, company must be managed properly and measurably 
that align with the interest of shareholders and stakeholders.  
3. Responsibility 
Company shall comply with the laws and regulations to fulfill its 
responsibilities for communities and environment in order to maintain long 
term sustainability of the business and recognized as Good Corporate 
Citizen (Corporate Social Responsibility).  
4. Independency  
Company must be managed independently in order to strengthen the 
implementation of good corporate governance with power balance to 
minimize the domination within the companies and intervention from other 
party.  
5. Fairness 
Company must always consider the shareholder’s interest and other 
stakeholder based on the equality and fairness principle. (KKNG, 2006) 
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Recommendations 
 Indonesia Financial Services Authority which is commonly known as 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) is an independent institution established in 2011 
aimed to regulate, supervise, examine and investigate the financial services sector 
in Indonesia. On 17th November 2015, OJK raised new standard of corporate 






















in Indonesia. Under OJK Rule No. 21/POJK.04/2015 and OJK Circular Letter No. 
32/SEOJK.04/2015 on the Implementation of Public Companies’ Corporate 
Governance Guidelines in which public companies are required to implement the 
OJK’s recommendations under the Corporate Governance Guidelines or if any of 
the recommendations can’t be met, it must be disclosed properly in the annual 
reports as well as explain the reason of not implementing the OJK’s 
recommendations. The rule and guidelines became effective on 17th November 
2015, however public companies are only required to disclose the OJK’s 
recommendations starting from their annual reports for the period ending on 31st 
December 2016 (Hadiputranto, Hadinoto & Partners, 2016).   
 Under the Corporate Governance guidelines, there are 25 recommendations 
including 5 aspects and 8 principles.  These 25 recommendations are: 
1.) Public Company has the manner or technical procedures to open or closed voting 
that promotes independency and interest of shareholders. 
2.) All members of the Board of Directors and members of the Board of 
Commissioners of Public Company attend the Annual GMS. 
3.) Upload the Summary of GMS at the Public Company's Website at least for one 
(1) year. 
4.) Public Company has communication policy with shareholder or investors. 
5.) Public Company discloses the policy on Public Company's communication with 
shareholders or investors on the Website. 
6.) Determination the number of the Board of Commissioners members by 






















7.) Determination of composition of the Board of Commissioners members by 
considering the diversity of expertise, knowledge and experience needed. 
8.) The Board of Commissioners has a self-assessment policy to assess Board of 
Commissioners' performance. 
9.) Self-assessment policy to assess Board of Commissioners performance is 
disclosed in the Public Company's Annual Report. 
10.) Board of Commissioners has a policy related to resignation of a member of 
Board of Commissioners if involved in financial crime. 
11.) Board of Commissioners or Committee conducting Nomination and 
Remuneration function in prepares a policy on succession process of Board of 
Directors members Nomination. 
12.) Determination of number of Board of Directors members has considered the 
condition of Public Company as well as effectiveness in decision-making. 
13.) Determination of Board of Director composition with the consideration of 
diversity in skill, knowledge, and experience needed. 
14.) Member of Board of Directors who oversee accounting or finance has expertise 
and/or knowledge in accounting. 
15.) Board of Directors has a self-assessment policy to assess Board of Directors 
performance. 
16.) Self-assessment policy to assess Board of Directors performance is disclosed 
in Public Company's Annual Report. 
17.) Board of Directors has a policy related to resignation of a member of Board of 






















18.) Public Company has a policy to prevent insider trading 
19.) Public Company has anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies 
20.) Public Company has a policy on selection and improvement of supplier or 
vendor capacities 
21.) Public Company has a policy on fulfillment of creditor's rights 
22.) Public Company has a policy on Whistleblowing system 
23.) Public Company has a policy on provision of long-term incentive to the Board 
of Directors and employees 
24.) Public Company use of information technology more broadly in addition to the 
Website as a media of transparency of information. 
25.) Annual Report of Public Company discloses the last beneficiary in Public 
Company's shareholding of at least five percent (5%), in addition to disclosure of 
the last beneficiaries in Public Company's shareholding through ultimate and 
controlling shareholders. 
The conventional corporate governance mechanism used to control agency 
problem type I is less effective and not strong enough to mitigate the agency 
problems in Asia with controlling and minority shareholder conflict, agency 
problem type II (Claessens et al.,2003 ; Atmaja, 2012). Therefore, other types of 
corporate governance mechanism are necessary to complete the conventional 
corporate governance mechanism. This research is different with prior research 
since it uses the new measurement of corporate governance recommendations based 






















Circular Letter No. 32/SEOJK.04/2015 as the new independent variable as well as 
the conventional governance mechanism.   
 
2.3 Expropriation  
Expropriation in general is defined as the action by the state or an authority 
of taking property from its owner for public use or benefit. However, in reality 
expropriation is mostly lead in the negative way. When the controlling shareholders 
have more control in the company to influence the management in determining the 
company’s decision, it may result in the expropriation. Hence, expropriation could 
be defined as the misuse of one’s control powers to maximize their own welfare 
and extract wealth from minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000). Tunneling 
and propping are two forms of expropriation activities. Tunneling refers to a 
transfer of resources out of company to its controlling shareholder through related 
party transaction. In other words, tunneling is a transfer of resources from lower 
level firm to higher level firm (Hamid, 2016). For instance, subsidiary company 
transferring assets to parent company at a lower value than its actual value, resulting 
the loss of the transaction in the dividend received by the shareholder of subsidiary 
company. Furthermore, Porta et al., (1999) also defined expropriation can take 
variety of forms, in the simplest way is when the controlling shareholders simply 
steal the profits or sell the assets, outputs, and their shares below the market prices 
to another firm they own. 
Two forms of tunneling according to Johnson, Porta, Lopez & Shleifer 






















for their own benefit through self-dealing transactions which include asset sales, 
contracts of transfer pricing beneficial to controlling shareholder, excessive 
executive compensation, loan guarantees and so on. Second is when the controlling 
shareholder increase their share without transferring any assets through dilutive 
share issues, insider trading, creeping acquisitions or other financial transactions 
that discriminate against minority shareholder.  
Meanwhile, propping is the opposite of expropriation. Propping happens 
when the controlling shareholder of a parent company transfer its economic of 
resources to its subsidiary company to support the financial difficulties. In this case, 
propping tends to act in the best interest of minority shareholder to ensure that its 
subsidiary company is running smoothly.  
This research uses expropriation as the independent variable with related 
party transactions of sales as the measurement. Related party transaction is normal, 
however several researches indicated that such transaction could be used to 
expropriate against the minority shareholder by manipulating the transfer pricing. 
Related party transaction indicating the tunneling activities seems to be harmful by 
simply transfer resources from the firm for his own benefit through self-dealing 
transactions and these can be considered as theft or fraud which is illegal 
everywhere (Johnson et al., 2000). 
 
2.3.1 Related Party Transactions (RPT)  
According to Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard (Pernyataan 






















entity’s transactions with related parties. A related party is a person or entity related 
to the entity that is preparing its financial statements. While, a related party 
transaction is a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related parties 
regardless of whether the price is charged. Related parties under PSAK 7 are:  
a) A person or a close member of that person’s family is related to a 
reporting entity if that person: 
(i) has control or joint control over the reporting entity;  
(ii)  has significant influence over the reporting entity; or  
(iii)  is a member of the key management personnel of the reporting 
entity or of a parent of the reporting entity. 
b) An entity is related to a reporting entity if any of the following conditions 
applies: 
(i)  The entity and the reporting entity are members of the same group 
(which means that each parent, subsidiary and fellow subsidiary is related 
to the others).  
(ii)  One entity is an associate or joint venture of the other entity (or an 
associate or joint venture of a member of a group of which the other entity 
is a member).  
(iii)  Both entities are joint ventures of the same third party.  
(iv)  One entity is a joint venture of a third entity and the other entity is 
an associate of the third entity.  
(v)  The entity is a post-employment defined benefit plan for the benefit 






















reporting entity. If the reporting entity is itself such a plan, the sponsoring 
employers are also related to the reporting entity.  
(vi)  The entity is controlled or jointly controlled by a person identified 
in (a).  
(vii)   A person identified in (a)(i) has significant influence over the entity 
or is a member of the key management personnel of the entity (or of a 
parent of the entity). 
According to Gordon, Henry, & Palia (2004), there are two alternative 
perspectives of related party transaction (RPT). The first view is abusive RPT based 
on the conflict of interest hypothesis that can be explained by agency theory and 
it’s used by the controlling shareholders to maximize their personal gain through 
tunneling. The second view is efficient RPT based on the efficient transactions 
hypothesis. This research uses abusive RPT based on the conflict of interest 
hypothesis which is a part of agency theory.   
 
2.4 Research Framework 
 This research examines the influence of corporate governance on the 
expropriation. The characteristic of Indonesian firm is concentrated ownership 
structure encouraging the controlling shareholder to expropriate against the 
minority shareholder by abusing their control power to maximize their own benefit. 
This problem is mostly known as agency problem type II (Villalonga et al., 2006). 
The theory that underlies the relationship between corporate governance and 






















theory, the conflict of interest hypothesis is in line with related party transaction 
that represent tunneling and can be used by the controlling shareholder to 
expropriate against the minority shareholder. The agency theory type II suggest that 
the expropriation can be minimized through improvement of corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
The conventional corporate governance mechanism used to control agency 
problem type I is less effective and not strong enough to mitigate the agency 
problems in Asia with controlling and minority shareholder conflict, agency 
problem type II (Claessens et al., 2003; Atmaja, 2012). Therefore, this research is 
quite different with prior research since it uses new measurement, the corporate 
governance recommendation based on the new standard raised by OJK rule No. 
21/POJK.04/2015 and OJK Circular Letter No. 32/SEOJK.04/2015 is used to 
measure the independent variable. In addition, this research also uses the 
conventional corporate governance mechanism as the independent variable 
inducing the board commissioner meeting frequency, audit committee meeting 
frequency, the number of independent commissioner. While, the related party 
transaction of sales is to measure the dependent variable, the expropriation. In short, 
the relationship between corporate governance and expropriation is summarized in 










































2.5 Previous Studies and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, prior studies that examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and expropriation will be briefly reviewed and explained. The findings 
of the previous studies will be useful for the current study and provide the 
foundation for the relationship between variables and thus hypotheses can be 
developed (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). The focus of corporate governance is 
grounded by the agency theory to protect the right of minority shareholders against 






transaction of sales 
Frequency of audit 
committee meeting 
Frequency of board of 
commissioner meeting 

























2.5.1 The influence of corporate governance recommendations on 
expropriation  
There are several empirical studies that support the positive link between 
corporate governance and expropriation. First, a recent study conducted by Yeh, 
Shu & Su (2012) in Taiwanese listed firms revealed that corporate governance 
could help to reduce tunneling activities by using corporate governance index as 
the measurement. This finding is consistent with the agency theory that justify the 
link between corporate governance and expropriation. Furthermore, Chien (2010) 
also found that corporate governance mechanism transfers the related party 
transactions from conflict of interest to efficient transactions in which helpful to 
company’s interest. This study used audit quality and independent boards as part of 
corporate governance mechanism play moderating roles on the relationship 
between related party transactions and firm performance.  
On the contrary, a research conducted by Sari, Djajadikerta, & Baridwan 
(2014) revealed that corporate governance mechanism could not explain the 
tunneling activities because independent board, audit committee and corporate 
structure variable including managerial ownership, foreign institutional ownership, 
domestic institutional ownership and state ownership structures are found to be 
insignificant factors for predicting the tunneling behavior in companies listed in 
IDX. So far, the studies that examines the relationship between corporate 






















inconsistent. This inconsistent research result motivated this study to test it further. 
Based on the explanation above, the hypothesis of the current study is: 
H1: Corporate governance recommendations negative affect to 
expropriation 
 
2.5.2 The influence of the number of independent commissioner on 
expropriation  
 According to the regulation of OJK no.33/POJK.04/2014, the public 
companies must have independent members in its board of commissioners. The 
public company must have minimum one independent commissioner or at least 
30% of the board of commissioners.  Independent commissioners are outsiders who 
are not affiliated with the controlling shareholder, board of director and other 
member in the board of commissioners. The criteria for independent commissioners 
that have been set by the regulation are (1) outsider of the public company, (2) don’t 
have any shares of the public company either directly or indirectly, (3) don’t 
affiliated with the controlling shareholders, director and within the board 
commissioner, (4) don’t have relationship business with public company either 
directly or indirectly.  
Prior research such as Chien (2010), Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney. (1995) suggested that larger proportions of outside directors 
(commissioner) significantly reduce financial fraudulence, due to the strict 
controlling and monitoring from the independent commissioners. Therefore, the 






















process in the company thus they would be able to reduce the level of expropriation. 
However, research by Mustafa, Latif & Taliyang (2011) and Sari et al., (2014) 
found that board independent is not an effective element in preventing the tunneling 
activities. The different research results are more due to the different state 
conditions in the protection of investors. Based on the explanation above, the 
hypothesis of the current study is: 
H2: The number of independent commissioner negative affect to 
expropriation  
 
2.5.3 The influence of board commissioner and audit committee meeting 
frequency on expropriation  
The effectiveness of board commissioner and audit committee can be 
assessed through the frequency of meetings held. According to the regulation of 
OJK no.33/POJK.04/2014, the board commissioners should be at least meet six 
times a year. Farber (2005) stated that the audit committees of firms engaged in 
fraudulent activities have less independent members and do not meet frequently. 
This implied that the audit committee meeting frequency forces the company to 
have better financial reporting quality. The higher the frequency of audit committee 
meetings is often associated with lower financial statement fraud and lead to better 
audit quality (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault & S. Reed 2002). In order to 
provide effective supervision on financial information disclosure, the committee 






















The meeting is a communication tool used by the board commissioner as 
well as audit committee in assessing, evaluating, and monitoring the company and 
thus the more frequent meetings have additional advantages. Research by Yin , Gao, 
Li, & Lv (2012) found that the proportion of shares owned by majority shareholder 
is negatively associated with the number of audit committee meetings in Chinese 
listed companies. However, Kamarudin, Ismail, & Alwi (2014) showed that there 
is no relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and corporate fraud 
in Malaysian listed companies. Therefore, the more frequent meetings held forces 
the company to have better financial reporting quality and thus limit the risk of 
related party transaction that represent expropriation. Based on the explanation 
above, the hypothesis of the current study are: 
H3: Board commissioner meeting frequency negative affect to 
expropriation 
















































3.1  Type of Research 
The current research uses quantitative method, to examine relationship 
among variables and determine cause and effect interactions between variables. 
Quantitative method research is also aimed to test the hypothesis. According to 
Sekaran et al., (2013) hypothesis testing is undertaken to explain the variance in the 
dependent variable or to predict organizational outcomes. Furthermore, the 
explanation concerning the sample selection, variables’ measurement, data 
collection, statistical model and data analysis method are provided in the next 
sections. 
 
3.2  Population and Samples 
Sekaran et al., (2013) defines populations as the whole group of people, 
events, or thing of interest that the researcher attempts to investigate. While sample, 
is a subset of the population. The population in this study are Indonesian company 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period of 2016. Firstly, the 
justification regarding the time period’s selection, 2016, is due to the fact that the 
new standard of corporate governance practice as the independent variable used in 
this research issued by OJK became effective on 17th November 2015, in which the 






















annual report starting from the period ending on 31st December 2016. Therefore, 
the data is the most recent and up to date which is useful to reflect the information 
and condition of the sample’s companies.  
The sample of this research is selected using one of nonprobability sampling 
method, which is purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a sampling method 
where the samples are chosen based on the several criteria and judgement (Sekaran 
et al., 2013). The criteria designed by the researcher are as follow: 
1. Indonesian company must be listed in IDX in the period of 2016.  
2. Indonesian company conduct transactions of sales with related party. 
3. Indonesian company discloses the recommendations issued by OJK. 
4. The financial statements are presented in Rupiah currency and must be 
available as well as audited by the independent auditor during the period.  
Given that, the following table demonstrates the research sample utilized 
in this study: 
Table 3. 1 
          Research Sample 
No Description Total 
1 Total listed company in IDX in 2016 534 
2 The annual report not available  57 
3 Financial statement using other currency than Rupiah  51 
4 
No related party transaction of sales 
359 
5 No new recommendations disclosed 364 























3.3  Data Collection Method 
This research uses secondary data as the main data source.  Secondary data 
refers to the data which is not directly gathered from the primary source such as 
questionnaire but it is gathered by someone or organization other than the researcher 
such as database and report (Sekaran et al., 2013). This research mainly obtains the 
data from the official website of Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) www.idx.co.id 
and Galeri Investasi BEI Universitas Brawijaya, comprised the annual report and 
financial report of 2016. Moreover, the documentation technique is uses in this 
research by gathering necessary information from annual report and financial report 
related with corporate governance and related party transaction. 
 
3.4  Research Variables and Measurement 
Research variables uses in this study includes independent variable and 
dependent variable. The description on each variable is provided in the next 
subsections. 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables 
1. Related party transaction of sales (RPTs) 
The dependent variable uses in the current study is expropriation referring 
to the misuse of one’s control powers by controlling shareholder to maximize their 
own welfare and extract wealth from minority shareholder. The proxy uses in this 
study is related party transaction of sales that represent tunneling in which refer on 






















et al., (2009), there are indications that related party transactions are made through 
tunneling purposes: 
1. Acquisitions of assets by listed company from related parties 
2. Sale of assets by listed company to related parties 
3. Asset swaps between listed company and its controlling shareholder 
4. Trade of goods or services between listed company and its controlling 
shareholder 
5. Cash payments, loans or provision of loan guarantees by listed company to 
its controlling shareholder 
These transactions are identified to have more tendency toward the 
tunneling activities since they could be used by the company to tunnel resources 
out to its related party through unfair pricing and thus lowering the value of 
company at the stake of minority shareholders (Sari et al., 2014). However, this 
research only uses related party transaction of sales measured by the ratio of total 
transaction of sales to related party divided by net sales. The higher the ratio means 
the higher of the transaction represent the tunneling purposes that could be used to 
expropriate against the minority shareholder. This information can be obtained in 





Related Party Transaction of Sales = Total transaction of sales to related party 






















3.4.2.  Independent Variables 
1. Corporate governance recommendations (GCG) 
The first independent variable uses in current study is corporate governance 
recommendations issued by OJK No. 32/SEOJK.04/2015. Under the new rule, 
there are 25 recommendations in 5 aspects and 8 principles. The rule requires 
public companies to implement the recommendations by stating comply or 
implemented in the annual report, otherwise if any of the recommendations haven’t 
been met then they must be disclose properly in the annual report by explaining 
the reason. GCG is measured by checklist by scoring 1 on each recommendation 
if it’s comply out of 25 recommendations (total 25 recommendations). Hence, if a 
company complies all recommendations it will be given 25 out of 25 which is the 
final score is 1. 
2. Conventional corporate governance mechanisms 
The measurement of corporate governance on the prior research are mostly 
done by measuring each component of corporate governance in which belongs to 
conventional corporate governance mechanism. However, the conventional one is 
less effective and not strong enough to tackle the agency problem type II in 
Indonesia leading to inconsistent result. The conventional corporate governance 
mechanism used in this study are describe below.  
1) The number of independent commissioner (INDCOM) 
Independent commissioner is outsider not affiliated with the controlling 
shareholder, board of director and other member in the board of commissioner. 






















commissioner or at least 30% of the board commissioner. Thus, the larger 
proportions of independent commissioner could enhance strong controlling 
and monitoring process in the company. The number of independent 
commissioner is measured by 
 
 
2) Frequency of meeting of board commissioner (FMBOC) 
 Frequency of meeting of board commissioner is number of meeting conducted 
by the board commissioner of Indonesian public companies. The higher the 
frequency of board commissioner meeting is associated with better financial 
reporting quality and thus limit the risk of related party transactions that 




3) Frequency of meeting of audit committee (FMAUC) 
Frequency of meeting of audit committee is number of meeting conducted by 
audit committee of Indonesian public companies. The higher frequency of 
audit committee meeting is associated with better financial reporting quality 
and thus limit the risk of related party transactions that represent tunneling 
activities. Meeting’s frequency of audit committee is measured by  
 
 
   The number of independent commissioner 
INDCOM=   
      Total number of board commissioner 
    
FMBOC=   Total number of meetings held by board   
commissioner  
    























3.5  Data Analysis Method 
In analyzing the data, this study uses SPSS 13 software. The analysis 
consists of multiple regression analysis, descriptive statistics, classic assumption 
and hypothesis testing.  
 
3.5.1  Descriptive Statistic 
According to Ghozali (2011), descriptive statistics provides a description of 
the data as shown from the average, standard deviation, variance, maximum, 
minimum. Hence, the descriptive statistics in this study is to provide some insights 
regarding each variable: corporate governance recommendations, expropriation 
proxied by related party transaction of sales and conventional corporate governance 
mechanism consist of board commissioner meeting, audit committee meeting and 
independent commissioner. 
 
3.5.2  Multiple Regression Analysis  
According to Ghozali (2011), regression analysis is the study of how 
dependent variable is related with one or more independent variables to estimate 
and predict the mean or average of the population. The regression equation is built 
to test the hypothesis and the regression analysis will be used to determine if the 
hypothesis proved significant or not. Thus, with the multiple regression analysis, 
the researcher will be able to measure the relationship between corporate 
























RPTs = α + β1GCG+ β2INDCOM + β3FMBOC + β4FMAUC + εi 
Note: 
α   : Constanta 
β   : Regression coefficient 
ε   : Residual error 
GCG  : Corporate governance recommendations  
INDCOM : Independent commissioner 
FMBOC : Frequency of board commissioner’s meeting 
FMAUC : Frequency of audit committee’s meeting 
 
3.5.2.1 Coefficient of Determination 
The coefficient of determination (R-squared) measures the model’s ability 
to explain the variation of the dependent variable or how close the data are to the 
fitted regression line.  The R-squared is always between 0 and 1.  In general, the 
higher the R-squared or close to one means the independent variables provide 
almost all the necessary information to predict the variation of the dependent 
variable. While, the smaller of R-squared indicating the ability of the independent 
variables to explain the variation of dependent variable are very limited.  
 
3.5.2.2 F-Test 
The F-test is used to indicates whether there is independent variable that has 






















the F-value from the calculation with the value of F according to the table (F-table). 
When F-value is greater than F-table, it means that at least there is one independent 
variable that affects the dependent variable.  
 
3.5.3  Classic Assumption  
The regression model in this research should meet the classical 
assumption’s condition in which there are no symptoms of normality, 
multicolinearity, and heteroscedasticity in order for the statistical test to be valid.  
 
3.5.3.1 Normality Test 
The purpose of normality test is used to check if the residuals or errors are 
normally distributed. Typically, to assess this assumption using the normal 
probability plot of the residuals and histogram. The normality assumption should 
be fulfilled in order for the statistical test to be valid.  
 
3.5.3.2 Multicolinearity Test  
Multicolinearity is a common problem of statistical phenomenon in which 
two or more independent variables are highly correlated, leading to unreliable result 
in a multiple regression model. A good regression model should not have 
correlation among the independent variables. Common measures for identifying 
multicolinearity are the tolerance value and the variance inflation factor (VIF) with 
common cutoff value of 0.10 tolerance value correspond to a VIF of 10. These 






















other independent variables (Sekaran et al., 2013). If the tolerance value is > 0.10 
and VIF is <10, thus it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity among 
the independent variable in the regression model. Meanwhile, if the tolerance value 
is <0.10 and VIF is >10, it means that there is multicolinearity among the 
independent variable in the regression model (Ghozali, 2011).  
 
3.5.3.3 Heteroscedasticity Test  
Heteroscedasticity test is aim to test whether in the regression model, 
variants of residual is unequal within the observations. Heteroscedasticity test is 
done by using the plot graphic test by checking whether there is a particular pattern 
in scatterplot graph between variance X and Y or not. If the dots are spread 
randomly around 0 number on axis Y in the scatterplot graph, it can be concluded 
that there is no heteroscedasticity. Otherwise, if there is a particular dots pattern, 
thus it can be concluded that there is heteroscedasticity. A good regression model 
is a model which is free from heteroscedasticity within one observation to another, 
or in the other word, if the variance from residual observation with other 
observation constantly remains, it is called homoscedasticity (Ghozali, 2011). 
 
3.5.4 Hypotheses Testing 
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to answer the hypothesis that have been 
construct in chapter 2. These can be checked through statistical measurement called 
t-test. This research uses one tailed test so that the significance of the t-value (sig. 























The t-test is basically to check if each independent variable has a significant 
effect on the dependent variable by comparing the t-value and t-table at significant 
level α = 5%. The assessment is as follows: 
a. If t-value is > t-table or if sig.t is < α, it means that the independent variables 
significantly influence the dependent variable, H0 is rejected. 
b. If t –value is < t-table or if sig. t is > α, it means that the independent variable has 

























RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistic 
In this section the results of descriptive statistical analysis will be provided 
and discussed. The results are useful to make summary and provide some insights 
regarding each variable used in this research consisting corporate governance 
recommendations, independent board commissioner, board commissioner meeting 
frequency and audit committee meeting frequency. The descriptive statistics 
include average, standard deviation, maximum and minimum. The data of the 
descriptive statistics is demonstrated and summarized in the table 4.1 
Table 4. 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
Related party transaction of 
sales (RPTs) 
91 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.26 
Corporate governance 
recommendations (GCG) 
91 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.42 
Independent Commissioner 
(INDCOM) 
91 0.25 1.00 0.41 0.12 
Frequency of board 
commissioner meeting 
(FMBOC) 
91 0.00 30.00 7.10 5.16 
Frequency of audit committee 
meeting (FMAUC) 
91 0.00 35.00 6.79 6.15 





















Based on the table 4.1, the average of expropriation of Indonesian public 
companies proxied by related party transaction of sales is 17% with 0.26 for 
standard deviation. The standard deviation is greater than the mean which is means 
the gap of RPTs is high. The corporate governance recommendations (GCG) have 
an average of 31% with 0.42 for standard deviation. The standard deviation is 
greater than the mean which is means the gap of GCG is high. The independent of 
board commissioner (INDCOM) average is 41% with 0.12 standard deviation. 
Frequency of board commissioner meeting (FMBOC) average is 7.10 with 5.16 
standard deviation. Frequency of audit committee meeting (FMAUC) average is 
6.79 with 6.15 standard deviation. The standard deviation of INDCOM, FMBOC, 
FMAUC are lower than the mean or the mean gap is low. Most of the data shows 
that mean is larger than standard deviation except RPTs and GCG. It is not a 
problem because the number of data is large enough  (more than 30 data). The large 
data tend to be normally distributed. So, this does not cause econometric problems. 
 
4.2  Multiple Regression Analysis  
The regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between 
corporate governance recommendations and mechanism on expropriation. The 

























Table 4. 2 
Result of multiple regression  
Variable Coefficients t-value F  R² 
Constant -1.431 -1.323 15.616** 0.421 
Corporate governance 
recommendations (GCG) 
-4.919** -3.488   
Independent Commissioner 
(INDCOM) 
-0.888 -1.097   
Frequency of board commissioner 
meeting (FMBOC) 
-0.823* -2.246   
Frequency of audit committee 
meeting (FMAUC) 
-1.030** -3.356     
**Significant at 0.01 level   *Significant at 0.05 level      
Source: Appendix 4 
 
The coefficient of determination is used to measure of how much the 
independent variable used in this research (GCG, INDCOM, FMBOC, FMAUC) 
contributed or influenced on the dependent variable which is related party 
transaction of sales (RPTs). Based on table 4.2, the coefficient of determination (R
2 ) is 0,421 in which means that 42,1% of the dependent variable (RPTs) is 
influenced by the independent variables (GCG, INDCOM, FMBOC, FMAUC). 
Meanwhile, the rest of 57.9% of the dependent variable (RPTs) is influenced by 
others independent variable which is not discussed in this research.  
Based on the table 4.2, the result of F-value is 15.616 significant at 0.01 
level. While the F-table is 2.209. Since F-value is > F-table which is 15.616 > 2.209 
or the value of Sig. F (0.000) is < α (0.050). Thus, it can be concluded that at least 
there is one independent variable in the regression model that has significant effect 





















(GCG), frequency of board commissioner meeting (FMBOC) and frequency of 
audit committee meeting (FMAUC).  
4.3  Classic Assumption  
The result of multiple regression is fit to the model because there are no 
violation of classical assumptions required such as normality of error, 
multicolinearity, heterocedastisity. Thus, the regression results are appropriate of 
being used to test the research hypothesis.  
 
4.3.1  Normality Test 
The normality test is used to check if the residuals or errors are normally 
distributed. Typically, to assess this assumption using the normal probability plot 
of the residuals and histogram. Based on appendix 4, it can be concluded that the 
residuals have normal distribution from the normal probability plot and histogram. 
Thus, the normality assumption is fulfilled and fit the model.  
 
4.3.2  Multicolinearity Test  
The purpose of multicolinearity test is in order for the regression model 
don’t have correlation among the independent variables. The measurement to 
identify multicolinearity are the tolerance value and the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) with common cutoff value of 0.10 tolerance value correspond to a VIF of 10. 
If the tolerance value > 0.10 and VIF <10, thus it can be concluded that there is no 
multicollinearity among the independent variable in the regression model and vice 





















and VIF of each independent variable is lower than 10, thus it can be concluded that 
the regression model is free from multicolinearity.  
Table 4. 3 




GCG 0.900 1.112 
INDCOM 0.905 1.104 
FMBOC 0.598 1.673 
FMAUC 0.690 1.449 
    Source: Appendix 4 
 
4.3.3  Heteroscedasticity Test  
A good regression model is a model which is free from heteroscedasticity. 
Heteroscedasticity test is done using the plot graphic test by checking whether there 
is a particular pattern in scatterplot graph between variance X and Y or not. If the 
dots are spread randomly around 0 number on axis Y in the scatterplot graph, it can 
be concluded that there is no heteroscedasticity and vice versa. The result of 
heteroscedasticity test can be seen on appendix 4. Based on the appendix 4, the 
scatterplot diagram shows the dots are spread randomly and doesn’t form a 

























4.4  Hypotheses Testing 
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to answer the hypothesis that have been 
construct in chapter 2. These can be checked through statistical measurement called 
t-test. This research used one tailed test so that the significance of the t-value (sig. 
t) should be divided by 2 to get the p value. 
In summary, hypothesis 1, 3, and 4 which reveals that corporate governance 
recommendations, frequency of commissioner board meeting, and frequency of 
audit committee meeting negative affect to expropriation are supported by 
empirical evidence in this study. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 which reveals that 
number of independent commissioner  does not affect to expropriation. 
 
4.5  Discussion 
Based on the statistical analysis presented in the previous sections and 
hypotheses that have been constructed in chapter 2, the following discussion 
regarding those results will be elaborated further and presented in this section. The 
discussion involves the influence of corporate governance recommendations, 
independent commissioner, frequency of board commissioner meeting, and 
frequency of audit committee meeting on expropriation.  
 
4.5.1 The influence of corporate governance recommendations on 
expropriation 
Based on the statistical results, this study shows significant causal 





















expropriation proxied by related party transaction of sales (RPTs). Therefore, the 
first hypothesis stated that corporate governance recommendations negative affect 
to expropriation is accepted. This means that corporate governance 
recommendations (GCG) work effectively in overcoming the expropriation in 
Indonesia. Overall, the result of this study is in line with the research by Claessens 
et al., (2003), who stated that the conventional corporate governance mechanism 
used to control agency problem type I is less effective and not strong enough to 
mitigate the agency problems in Asia, therefore other type of corporate governance 
mechanism is necessary to complete the conventional corporate governance 
mechanism.  
The corporate governance recommendations is a new measurement based 
on the new rule issued by OJK No. 32/SEOJK.04/2015 about the guidelines of 
corporate governance for public companies. It consists of 25 recommendations in 5 
aspects and 8 principles. This rule is mandatory for all Indonesian public companies 
to disclose the recommendations by stating comply or implement in their annual 
report, otherwise if any of the recommendations haven’t been met then they must 
disclose it properly in the annual report by explaining the reason. This rule becomes 
effective on 17th November 2015 in which the public companies are only required 
to disclose the recommendations in their annual report starting from the period 
ending on 31st December 2016.   
The result of this research shows that corporate governance is an effective 





















transaction of sales (RPTs) that represent expropriation in Indonesia which is in line 
with the agency theory.  
 
4.5.2 The influence of independent commissioner on expropriation 
Based on the statistical result, this study shows insignificant causal 
relationships between independent commissioner (INDCOM) and expropriation 
proxied by related party transaction of sales (RPTs). Therefore, the second 
hypothesis stated that independent commissioner negative affect to expropriation is 
rejected. This means that independent commissioner doesn’t work effectively in 
overcoming the expropriation in Indonesia. It implied that number whether large or 
small does not enough to control and monitor related party transaction, but the 
quality of the independent commissioner is also important to control and monitor 
the process in the company. The number independent commissioner may only be 
added just to comply with the regulation. Instead, they are not competent and lack 
of quality in overcoming the expropriation in Indonesia. Moreover, the independent 
commissioner is elected by shareholders in a general meeting that it grants more 
power to controlling shareholders to appoint the persons they prefer. The 
controlling shareholders obviously would prefer to choose the person who are more 
inclined to agree with them though independent commissioner are technically 
independent in the eyes of law. Thus, it might affect how independent commissioner 
would behave considering his or her relationship with the company resulting in the 
lack of integrity (Chen, Wan and Zang, 2017). The result supports by previous 





















relationship with the related party transactions, and these transactions would not 
neglect the interest of minority shareholders’ rights. The result of this research is 
also in line with research by Sari et al., (2014) that independent commissioner are 
not an effective corporate governance mechanism in preventing the tunneling 
activities in Indonesia.  
This research is in contrast with prior research such as such as Beasley 
(1996), Dechow et al., (1995) and agency theory that argued that board 
independence as a part of corporate governance mechanism will minimize 
expropriation against the minority shareholder. This is because the larger 
proportions of outside directors (commissioner) significantly reduce financial 
fraudulence, due to the strict controlling and monitoring from the independent 
commissioners. Therefore, the functions of independent commissioner can enhance 
the controlling and monitoring process in the company thus they would be able to 
reduce the level of expropriation of minority shareholder.  
The research shows that some public companies haven’t comply the 
regulations by having only 25% of independent commissioner. The lower the 
proportion of independent commissioner the lower the function of independent 
commissioner to control and monitor the related party transaction in company. 
According to the regulation of OJK number 33/POJK.04/2014, the public 
companies must have independent members in the board of commissioners . The 
public company must have minimum one independent commissioner or at least 






















4.5.3 The influence of frequency of board commissioner’s meeting and 
frequency of audit committee’s meeting on expropriation  
Given that the statistical results in previous section show significant 
relationship of frequency of board commissioner meeting (FMBOC) and frequency 
of audit committee meeting (FMAUC) on expropriation proxied by related party 
transaction of sales (RPTs). Therefore, the third and fourth hypothesis stated that 
frequency of board commissioner meeting and frequency of audit committee 
meeting negative affect to expropriation is accepted. This means that frequency of 
board commissioner meeting and frequency of audit committee meeting work 
effectively in overcoming the expropriation in Indonesia. The result of this research 
is in line with research by Yin et al., (2012) that the proportion of shares owned by 
majority shareholder is negatively associated with the number of audit committee 
meetings in Chinese listed companies. The more frequent meetings forces the 
company to have better financial reporting quality and thus limit the risk of related 
party transaction that represent expropriation. Moreover, a routine of audit 
committee meeting can reduce the agency problem and information asymmetry as 
the audit committee can provide a fair and timely financial information to the 
management, shareholders and potential investors (DeZoort et al., 2002). The 
higher the frequency of audit committee meetings is often associated with lower 
financial statement fraud and lead to better audit quality (DeZoort et al., 2002). 
While, the result of this result of this research is in contrast with research by 
Kamarudin et al., (2014) shows that there is no relationship between frequency of 





















The result of this research shows that frequency of board commissioner 
meeting and frequency of audit committee meeting are effective corporate 
governance mechanism of investor protection in limiting the number of related 
party transaction of sales (RPTs) that represent expropriation in Indonesia which is 
in line with the agency theory.. The more frequent the meeting, the more reliable 
the financial information provided to shareholders as well as the better the quality 
























CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION 
 
5.1  Conclusion 
This research primarily aims to examine the effect of corporate governance 
on expropriation among Indonesian public companies. The independent variables 
used in this research are corporate governance recommendations, independent 
commissioner, frequency of board commissioner meeting and frequency of audit 
committee meeting. While, the dependent variable is expropriation proxied by 
related party transaction of sales (RPTs).  
The findings of this study revealed that expropriation through RPTs could 
be minimized by corporate governance recommendations, frequency of board 
commissioner meeting and frequency of audit committee meeting in Indonesia. 
This implied that the recommendations show a better quality and disclosure in 
implementing the corporate governance. Moreover, the higher the meeting’s 
frequency is associated with lower financial statement fraud and lead to better 
financial reporting quality and thus limit the risk of related party transactions that 
represent tunneling activities. Therefore, corporate governance recommendations, 
frequency of board commissioner meeting and frequency of audit committee 
meeting shows that corporate governance is an effective mechanism of shareholder 
protection in limiting the number of related party transaction of sales (RPTs) that 






















However, result of this study shows that independent commissioner doesn’t 
work effectively in overcoming expropriation in Indonesia. This implied the 
number of independent commissioner is not enough to control expropriation. 
Instead, quality of the independent commissioner should be competent to control 
and monitor the process in overcoming the expropriation of the company. The 
number of independent commissioner may only be added just to comply with the 
regulation. Moreover, it is possible that this independent board approved the RPT 
and assumed that these transactions would not neglect the interest of minority 
shareholders’ rights. 
 
5.2  Research Limitation 
There is a limitation existing in this research. This study only employs 2016 
data, due to the application of corporate governance recommendations rules that 
apply from that year. That is the number of unused samples which does not fulfill 
the selection criteria such as company with foreign currency of 51 companies, 
unavailability of annual report of 57 companies, and annual report without 
corporate governance recommendations of 364 companies. These unused samples 
might have effect in the statistical analysis. 
 
5.3 Suggestion for Future Research 
Given the limitation above, future researchers are expected to employ a 
longer period of observation in order to get the insight of real conditions associated 
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Appendix 1. List of Samples 
No Code Company Name 
1 ABBA Mahaka Media Tbk 
2 ACST PT Acset Indonusa Tbk. 
3 AGII PT Aneka Gas Industri Tbk. 
4 AKPI Argha Karya Prima Ind. Tbk 
5 AKRA AKR Corporindo Tbk 
6 ALMI Alumindo Light Metal Industry Tbk 
7 ALTO Tri Banyan Tirta Tbk 
8 AMFG Asahimas Flat Glass Tbk 
9 ARNA Arwana Citramulia Tbk 
10 ASGR Astra Graphia Tbk 
11 ASII Astra International Tbk 
12 ASRI ALAM SUTERA REALTY Tbk 
13 BAJA Saranacentral Bajatama Tbk 
14 BATA Sepatu Bata Tbk 
15 BEST Bekasi Fajar Industrial Estate Tbk 
16 BISI BISI INTERNATIONAL Tbk 
17 BKSL Sentul City Tbk 
18 BTON Betonjaya Manunggal Tbk 
19 BUDI PT Budi Starch & Sweetener Tbk. 
20 BUKK Bukaka Teknik Utama Tbk 
21 CINT  PT Chitose Internasional Tbk 
22 CITA Cita Mineral Investindo Tbk 
23 CLPI Colorpak Indonesia Tbk 
24 CPIN Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk 
25 CPRO Central Proteina Prima Tbk 
26 CSAP Catur Sentosa Adiprana Tbk 
27 DAJK PT Dwi Aneka Jaya Kemasindo Tbk. 
28 DLTA Delta Djakarta Tbk 
29 DVLA Darya-Varia Laboratoria Tbk 
30 ELSA Elnusa Tbk 
31 EMDE Megapolitan Developments Tbk 
32 EPMT Enseval Putra Megatrading Tbk 












































35 HMSP HM Sampoerna Tbk 
36 ICBP Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk 
37 IMAS Indomobil Sukses Internasional Tbk 
38 IMPC PT Impack Pratama Industri Tbk 
39 INAF Indofarma Tbk 
40 INAI Indal Aluminium Industry Tbk 
41 INCI Intanwijaya Internasional Tbk 
42 INDF Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk 
43 INTA Intraco Penta Tbk 
44 INTP Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk 
45 JECC Jembo Cable Company Tbk 
46 JPRS Jaya Pari Steel Tbk 
47 KAEF Kimia Farma (Persero) Tbk 
48 KICI Kedaung Indah Can Tbk 
49 KLBF Kalbe Farma Tbk 
50 LION Lion Metal Works Tbk 
51 LMSH Lionmesh Prima Tbk 
52 LSIP PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk 
53 MBTO Martina Berto Tbk 
54 MDLN Modernland Realty Ltd Tbk 
55 MERK Merck Tbk 
56 META Nusantara Infrastructure Tbk 
57 MICE Multi Indocitra Tbk 
58 MIDI Midi Utama Indonesia Tbk 
59 MKNT PT Mitra Komunikasi Nusantara Tbk. 
60 MLBI Multi Bintang Indonesia Tbk 
61 MLPL Multipolar Tbk 
62 MLPT PT Multipolar Technology Tbk. 
63 MTDL Metrodata Electronics Tbk 
64 MYOR Mayora Indah Tbk 
65 PBSA PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk 
66 PTBA Bukit Asam Tbk 
67 RICY Ricky Putra Globalindo Tbk 
68 RMBA Bentoel International Investama Tbk 
69 ROTI Nippon Indosari Corpindo Tbk 
70 SCCO 
Supreme Cable Manufacturing Corporation 
Tbk 
71 SIDO 
PT Industri Jamu dan Farmasi Sido Muncul 
Tbk 
72 SIMP Siwani Makmur Tbk 






















74 SKBM Sekar Bumi Tbk 
75 SKLT Sekar Laut Tbk 
76 SMCB Holcim Indonesia Tbk 
77 SMAR SMART Tbk 
78 SMGR Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 
79 SMRA PT Summarecon Agung Tbk 
80 SMSM Selamat Sempurna Tbk 
81 SRSN Indo Acidatama Tbk 
82 TBLA Tunas Baru Lampung Tbk 
83 TCID Mandom Indonesia Tbk 
84 TRIS Trisula International Tbk 
85 TOTO Surya Toto Indonesia Tbk 
86 TSPC Tempo Scan Pacific Tbk 
87 TURI Tunas Ridean Tbk 
88 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk 
89 WEHA PT WEHA Transportasi Indonesia Tbk 
90 WICO Wicaksana Overseas International Tbk 
































Appendix 2. Research Data 
Y1 X1 X2 X3 X4 
RPTs GCG INDCOM FMBOC FMAUC 
0.0021 1 0.50 6 4 
0.1457 0.76 0.33 6 12 
0.7234 0.6 0.33 4 3 
0.1778 0.92 0.50 4 20 
0.0782 0.84 0.36 6 7 
0.0350 0.96 0.33 4 6 
0.1802 0.92 0.40 6 5 
0.0158 0.96 0.33 6 7 
0.1253 0.96 0.50 15 14 
0.7355 0.4 0.33 1 4 
0.1104 0.88 0.33 6 4 
0.0087 0.96 0.33 6 6 
0.0021 1 0.50 14 12 
0.6289 0.72 0.40 7 10 
0.0488 0.92 0.40 4 4 
0.0422 0.92 0.43 6 5 
0.0085 0.92 0.33 11 15 
0.0157 0.92 0.43 6 4 
0.0031 1 0.67 9 6 
0.0155 0.96 0.43 6 4 
0.1986 0.92 0.33 4 16 
0.0341 0.92 0.40 12 12 
0.0099 0.84 0.50 6 13 
0.0029 0.92 0.33 6 6 
0.5389 0.84 0.40 3 4 
0.4013 0.68 0.33 6 5 
0.0006 1 1.00 30 21 
0.6573 0.8 0.50 4 4 
0.1712 0.88 0.29 12 4 
0.0155 0.92 0.50 11 5 
0.8676 0.84 0.50 7 4 
0.9355 0.52 0.40 2 3 
0.0560 0.96 0.80 6 4 
0.0039 0 0.25 4 12 
0.0720 0 0.33 6 6 
0.0009 0 0.33 12 14 






















0.0241 0 0.50 9 4 
0.7349 0 0.50 6 0 
0.0652 0 0.40 3 10 
0.0113 0 0.50 4 4 
0.0077 0 0.50 6 4 
0.2061 0 0.50 6 4 
1.0000 0 0.33 0 0 
0.0306 0 0.33 2 4 
0.0020 0 0.33 12 5 
0.0163 0 0.50 8 0 
0.0006 0 0.33 12 31 
0.1950 0 0.43 1 4 
0.0151 0 0.40 15 4 
0.0778 0 0.33 6 5 
0.0157 0 0.33 4 8 
0.0045 0 0.50 12 5 
0.7666 0 0.33 7 0 
0.0848 0 0.40 6 4 
0.4511 0 0.33 5 4 
0.0988 0 0.60 6 4 
0.0003 0 0.33 12 12 
0.2346 0 0.33 4 4 
0.2622 0 0.33 6 4 
0.0006 0 0.33 12 20 
0.4897 0 0.33 9 6 
0.8580 0 0.33 0 0 
0.0047 0 0.40 3 4 
0.7620 0 0.33 3 4 
0.1581 0 0.33 6 6 
0.0002 0 0.50 24 35 
0.0019 0 0.33 6 12 
0.0027 0 0.33 6 6 
0.0415 0 0.40 6 4 
0.3010 0 0.50 4 4 
0.0014 0 0.33 5 4 
0.0016 0 0.33 2 2 
0.0496 0 0.33 13 5 
0.0522 0 0.33 4 5 
0.0119 0 0.50 6 4 
0.6046 0 0.33 4 4 






















0.3150 0 0.33 9 4 
0.1443 0 0.33 6 10 
0.0165 0 0.33 4 0 
0.0289 0 0.43 6 5 
0.0017 0 0.50 4 4 
0.0063 0 0.38 6 4 
0.3657 0 0.33 0 0 
0.1094 0 0.33 4 4 
0.0001 0 0.60 30 22 
0.0152 0 0.40 4 4 
0.0100 0 0.33 6 2 
0.0074 0 0.40 12 4 



















































91 .00 1.00 .1736 .26485
91 .00 1.00 .3138 .42675
91 .25 1.00 .4101 .12781
91 .00 30.00 7.1099 5.16710















































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: RPTsb. 
Model Summaryb








Predictors: (Constant), FMAUC, GCG, INDCOM, FMBOCa. 
Dependent Variable: RPTsb. 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), FMAUC, GCG, INDCOM, FMBOCa. 
Dependent Variable: RPTsb. 
Coefficientsa
-1.431 1.082 -1.323 .189
-4.919 1.410 -.302 -3.488 .001 .900 1.112
-.888 .809 -.095 -1.097 .276 .905 1.104
-.823 .366 -.238 -2.246 .027 .598 1.673














t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics

































































































































































Model Summary  and Paramete r Estimates
Dependent Variable: RPTs
.142 14.761 1 89 .000 -3.822 -6.147
Equation
Linear




The independent variable is GCG.
Model Summary  and Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable: RPTs
.060 5.711 1 89 .019 -5.588 -2.304
Equation
Linear




The independent variable is INDCOM.
Model Summary  and Paramete r Estimates
Dependent Variable: RPTs
.278 34.302 1 89 .000 -.266 -1.820
Equation
Linear




The independent variable is FMBOC.
Model Summary  and Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable: RPTs
.227 26.124 1 89 .000 -1.029 -1.480
Equation
Linear




The independent variable is FMAUC.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
